The aim of this paper is to introduce cooperative games with a feasible coalition system which is called antimatroid. These combinatorial structures generalize the permission structures, which have nice economical applications. With this goal, we ...rst characterize the approaches from a permission structure with special classes of antimatroids. Next, we use the concept of interior operator in ...

Non-cooperative games are mathematical models of interactive strategic decision situations. In contrast to cooperative models, they build on the assumption that all possibilities for commitment and contract have been incorporated in the rules of the game. This contribution describes the main models (games in normal form, and games in extensive form), as well as the main concepts that have been ...

A (TU) cooperative game is extendable (Kikuta and Shapley, 1986) if every core allocation of each sub-game can be extended to a core allocation of the game. It is strongly extendable if any minimal vector in the upper core of any of its sub-games can be extended to a core allocation. We prove that strong extendability is equivalent to largeness of the core (Sharkey, 1982). Further, we character...

Game Theory has proven to be a useful tool for modelling decision problems in competitive and collaborative environments. Cooperative games, in turn, promote the bargaining and the formation of coalitions, and deals with problems as the redistribution of gained payo between members of coalitions. This paper introduces the concept of indistinguishability among players, providing constructive met...

Roughly speaking, Game Theory deals with analysing conflict and cooperation situations in which two or more rational and intelligent agents are involved. There are many real and theoretical situations which can be examined from the point of view of Game Theory. Therefore it is not difficult to find in the literature a rich variety of applications of Game Theory to many and very diverse fields o...

In this paper we study cooperative cost games arising from domination problems on graphs. We introduce three games to model the cost allocation problem and we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the balancedness of all three games. Furthermore we study concavity of these games.

Preface This book investigates the classical model of cooperative games with trans-ferable utility (TU-games) and models in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially, namely fuzzy and multichoice games. In a crisp game the agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to cooperate with...

We treat a class of multi-person bargaining mechanisms based on games in coalitional form. For this class of games we identify properties of non-cooperative solution concepts, which are necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium outcomes to coincide with the core of the underlying coalitional form game. We view this result as a non-cooperative axiomatization of the core. In contrast to most o...

Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables. In this work we still consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded disturbances. We do not focus on solving a spec...

Bundling is a basic problem in commerce. We define and study the Bundling Game: each of n players with a unique product to sell can choose to sell their products in bundles with other players’ products so as to maximize their payoff; the players all have knowledge of the valuations of m (potential) buyers for each of the products. We define two natural classes of payoff functions Fair Profit Sh...