We study intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity in an experimental Cournot oligopoly. Previous empirical results this setting have demonstrated convergence to competitive outcomes, agreement with theoretical predictions assuming that players imitate successful opponents. postulate sometimes rely on imitation of behavior, and best reply the actions others. Testable are obtained from a model a...

We investigate the role of incentives set by a parent firm for competition among its subsidiaries. In a Cournot experiment four subsidiaries of the same parent operate in the same market. Parents earn a specific share of the joint profit and can choose how to distribute the remaining surplus (or loss). Results show that parents allocating profits equally among their subsidiaries reach outcomes ...

We examine cost-reducing investment in vertically-related oligopolies, where firms may be vertically integrated or separated. Analyzing a standard linear Cournot model, we show that: (i) Integrated firms invest more than separated competitors. (ii) Vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment. (iii) Firms may integrate strategically so as to preempt investme...

Recent literature shows that learning in oligopoly games might in the long run result in the Cournot or in the Walras equilibrium. Which outcome is achieved seems to depend on the underlying learning dynamics. This paper analyzes the forces behind the learning mechanisms determining the long run outcome. Apart from the fact that there is a difference between social and individual learning, the ...

In order to analyse the stability of cartel structures in a Cournot oligopoly, I propose a noncooperative game of coalition formation in which any group of firms can induce a dismantling deviation such that each member is in a smaller cartel in the resulting structure. It is required that a deviation only occurs if it is robust against further dismantling deviation. I characterise the set of st...

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives indu...

I study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Since firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit...

A game with single-valued best-replies and a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game if and only if the sequential best-reply dynamics converge (Cournot stability). If the PSNE is not unique, convergence to the set of equilibria is still ensured. It follows, for example, that (a) any strictly quasi-concave supermodular game with a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game, (b) any strictly ...

Guirao and Rubio [6] introduces an economic model, which generalizes the classical duopoly of Cournot type, where the competitors are located around a circle or a line and each rm competes à la Cournot with its right and left neighboring. For the case of having three and four players we describe completely the bifurcations of equilibria in terms of the production costs of each rm and we study t...