This ‘Russian Cards’ problem originated at the Moscow Math Olympiad 2000. An analysis in dynamic epistemic logic and various solutions are presented in [vD03]. But there remained some open questions related to the dynamics. In this contribution we answer one of those questions. They are not trivial, because the interpretation of an announcement that is made towards a solution of the problem, al...

Dynamic epistemic logic is the logic of the effects of epistemic actions like making public announcements, passing private messages, revealing secrets, telling lies. This paper takes its starting point from the version of dynamic epistemic logic of [2], and demonstrates a tool that can be used for showing what goes on during a series of epistemic updates: the dynamic epistemic modelling tool DE...

In this work we investigate the feasibility of the project of showing that a certain kind of generalisations that philosophers call ‘Epistemic Principles’, which state conditions for the achievement of epistemic goods such as justifications and entitlements, fulfil general conditions for their correctness. First, we identify the veritistic commitments underlying the project; it is argued that s...

We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only "secondary values" that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones whe...

I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focussed on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction leads...

One central debate in recent literature on epistemic normativity concerns the epistemic norm for action. This paper argues that this debate is afflicted by a category mistake: strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an epistemic norm for action. To this effect, I introduce a distinction between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content; I argue that, while it is plausible that norms...

In this paper, a new argument for an expressivist account of epistemic modals is developed. The argument starts from a puzzle about epistemic modals that Seth Yalcin recently presented. Yalcin’s own solution to the puzzle is rejected and a better explanation is given which is based on expressivism concerning epistemic modals. Furthermore, two alleged problems for expressivism are addressed: fir...

Building on a long research tradition (cf. 1), this paper proposes to apply the distinction between data (information stored in the agent’s mind) and beliefs (information accepted as reliable) to belief revision modeling (cf. 2), in order to integrate belief change in the overall epistemic processing of the agent. As a result, a more comprehensive and complex model of epistemic dynamics is form...

In this case, a physician rejects a patient's concerns that tainted water is harming the patient and her community. Stereotypes and biases regarding socioeconomic class and race/ethnicity, constraining diagnostic frameworks, and fixed first impressions could skew the physician's judgment. This paper narratively illustrates how cultivating humility could help the physician truly hear the patient...

I explore the prospects for modelling epistemic rationality (in the probabilist setting) via an epistemic decision theory, in a consequentialist spirit. Previous work has focused on cases in which the truth-values of the propositions in which the agent is selecting credences do not depend, either causally or merely evidentially, on the agent’s choice of credences. Relaxing that restriction lead...