The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games. GLOBAL NEWTON METHOD FOR STOCHASTIC GAMES SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON Abstract. The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equi...

We revisit the model of Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) but under the assumption that risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto efficient. It is found that risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria and some non-monomorphic states can emerge in the long run when players interact with their immediate neighbors only.

The main justification for cash-in-advance (CIA) equilibria when there are multiple assets is a Shapley-Shubik trading-post model where the agents coordinate on a particular medium of exchange. Of course, there are other equilibria. We introduce a refinement and show that the CIA equilibrium does not satisfy our refinement while there exist equilibria that do.

Computing equilibria of multiplayer noncooperative normal form games is a difficult computational task. In games having more equilibria mathematical algorithms are not capable to detect all equilibria at a time. Evolutionary algorithms are powerful search tools for solving difficult optimization problems. It is shown how an evolutionary algorithm designed for multimodal optimization can be used...

The papers in this symposium address the issue of multiple equilibria that can be induced by monetary policy in models with capital accumulation. In particular they examine how the “Taylor Principle,” under which interest rates respond more than proportionately to increases in inflation, can generate multiple equilibria. They also explore the design of policies to avoid the problem of multiple ...

We discuss linear Ricardo models with a range of parameters. We show that the exact boundary of the region of equilibria of these models is obtained by solving a simple integer programming problem. We show that there is also an exact correspondence between many of the equilibria resulting from families of linear models and the multiple equilibria of economies of scale models.

We propose a procedure for computing Nash equilibria in multi-player timed games with reachability objectives. Our procedure is based on the construction of a finite concurrent game, and on a generic characterization of Nash equilibria in (possibly infinite) concurrent games. Along the way, we use our characterization to compute Nash equilibria in finite concurrent games.

The interchangeability property of Nash equilibria in two-player zerosum games is well-known. This paper studies possible generalizations of this property to multi-party zero-sum games. A form of interchangeability property for strict Nash equilibria in such games is established. It is also shown, by proving a completeness theorem, that strict Nash equilibria do not satisfy any other non-trivia...