Introduction. 1. The general model. 2. The condition for the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium with D = 0. 3. The additive viability model. 4. The multiplicative viability model. 5. A general necessary condition for the stability of a nontrivial equilibrium with D = 0. 6. A general symmetric viability model. 6.1 Derivation of equilibrium solutions. 6.2 Conditions for stability of the equili...

We study an exchange economy with indivisible objects that may not be substitutes for each other, and we introduce the p-substitutability condition, a relaxation of the gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982), in which a parameter vector p is adopted to permit complicated types of complementarity. We prove that for any economy E, there exists a corresponding vector pE such that...

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity con...

We build a model for the hepatic fatty acid metabolism and its metabolic and genetic regulations. The model has two functioning modes: synthesis and oxidation of fatty acids. We provide a sufficient condition (the strong lipolytic condition) for the uniqueness of its equilibrium. Under this condition, modifications of the glucose input produce equilibrium shifts, which are gradual changes from ...

We examine a novel idea for the detection of Nash Equilibrium developed in [14] and apply it to Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (EPECs). EPECs are Nash games which uniquely feature players constrained by a condition governing equilibrium of a parametric system. By redefining the selection criteria used in evolutionary methods, EPECs can be solved using Evolutionary Multiobject...

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a particular correlated equilibrium distribution from this class does not satisfy the Maskin monotonicity con...

It is shown that two arbitrary equilibria in the general equilibrium model without sign restrictions on endowments can be joined by a continuous equilibrium path that contains at most two critical equilibria. This property is strengthened by showing that regular equilibria having an index equal to 1, a necessary condition for stability, can be joined by a path containing no critical equilibrium...

In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilbria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an equilibrium outco...