Do citizens welcome the involvement of independent experts in politics? Theoretical and empirical work so far provides conflicting answers to this question. On one hand, may demand expert political decision-making processes order ensure efficient effective governance solutions. other can be distrustful reject unaccountable non-transparent nature expert-based governance. This note investigates c...

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Expert latent f ingerprint examiners were presented with fingerprints taken from real criminal cases. Half of the prints had been previously judged as individualizations and the other half as exclusions. We re-presented the same prints to the same experts who had judged them previously, but provided biasing contextual information in both the individualizations and exclusions. A control set of i...

We describe and analyze an algorithm for predicting a sequence of n-dimensional binary vectors based on a set of experts making vector predictions in [0, 1]. We measure the loss of individual predictions by the 2-norm between the actual outcome vector and the prediction. The loss of an expert is then the sum of the losses experienced on individual trials. We obtain bounds for the loss of our ex...

Combining forecasts from different models has shown to perform better than single forecasts in most times series. In this paper new techniques for combining a large number of forecasting models in order to achieve better forecasting performance are introduced. This class of new techniques for combining is based on using consistent experts for forecasting.

We study competitive equilibria in a signaling economy with heterogeneously informed buyers. In terms of the classic Spence (1973) model of job market signaling, firms have access to direct but imperfect information about worker types, in addition to observing their education. Firms can be ranked according to the quality of their information, i.e. their expertise. In equilibrium, some high type...