We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action. JEL Classificatio...

This paper develops and applies a new approach for analyzing the spatial aspects of individual adoption of a technology that produces a mixed public-private good. The technology is an animal insecticide treatment called a “pouron” that individual households buy and apply to their animals. Private benefits accrue to households whose animals are treated, while the public benefits accrue to all th...

Complex group behavior arises in social insects colonies as the integration of the actions of simple and redundant individual insects Adler and Gordon, 1992, Oster and Wilson, 1978]. Furthermore, the colony can act as an information center to expedite foraging Brown, 1989]. We apply these lessons from natural systems to model collective action and memory in a computational agent society. Collec...