We propose a dynamic model for studying the time evolution of fish stocks in an environment divided into two adjacent zones with different fishing policies. We analyze two particular harvesting methods: constant fishing effort and profit maximization. In this case, some agents engage in competition based on maximization of individual profit whereas others cooperate. The asymptotic behavior of t...

We show that under horizontal differentiation pure symmetric Cournot equilibria exist if firms react to a rise in competitors’ output in such a way that their market price does not rise. This condition is related to strategic complementarity, but not to convexity or differentiability. We rule out multiple equilibria under some additional conditions and discuss stability and regularity of equili...

In many competitive settings consumers buy multiple product categories, and some prefer to use a single firm, generating complementary cross-category price effects. To study pricing in supermarkets, an organizational form where these effects are internalized, we develop a multi-category multi-seller demand model and estimate it using UK consumer data. This class of model is used widely in theor...

This paper analyzes a finite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly, restricting attention to Markov strategies. The solution yields stationary patterns, independent of initial conditions, where the reaction-functions follow cycles of three periods. The market price never settles down, and is at all times strictly above marginal cost. Long-run average industry profits are approximately 5 6 of...

We introduce a simple model of oligopolistic competition where firms first build capacity, and then, after observing the capacity decisions, choose a reservation price at which they are willing to supply their capacities. This model describes many markets more realistically than the model of Kreps and Scheinkman [Kreps, D., Scheinkman, J., 1983. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition y...

A well-known result by Vega-Redondo implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in …xed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction ...

I consider the interaction of trade and environmental policies in two canonical models: competitive general equilibrium (which I extend to allow for monopoly power in trade) and multi-period oligopoly (which I extend to incorporate a general pollution abatement technology). Despite the complexities of the models and the considerable differences between them, they have surprisingly similar impli...

In this paper, we study the strategic R&D collaboration by introducing a virtual player to reveal cooperative incentives and keeping investment share and market share independent of each other. We show that high R&D input share must be reflected by high market share, and R&D investment increases with the success probability. Not consistently with the prevailing viewpoint, we also find firms’ R&...

The impact of Trade Points on corporate performance depends on assumptions about returns to scale, types of games played, and size of gains in demand and revenues v i s á v i s costs. Specifically: (i) in a world of profitmaximizing firms, when the contribution of Trade Points to total revenues exceeds the additional costs, Trade Points help both small firms and large ones with the size of gain...

Price-setting and quantity-setting oligopoly games lead to extremely different outcomes in the market. One natural way to address this problem is to formulate a model in which some firms use price while the remaining firms use quantity as their decision variable. We introduce a mixed oligopoly game of this type and determine its equilibria. In addition, we consider an extension of this mixed ol...