School of Medicine, Belgrade University,Cardiology Clinic, Clinical Centre of Serbia, Visegradska 26, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia; Aalborg Thrombosis ResearchUnit, Department of Clinical Medicine, Faculty of Health, Aalborg University, DK-9100 Aalborg, Denmark; Service De Cardiologie, Hopital Timone Adultes 264, Rue Saint Pierre, 13385 Marseille Cedex 05, France; Cardiology Department, St Olavs Hosp...

Design of contracts that define firm, and their accounting systems depend on the conditions in the firm’s factor and product markets. We examine the fundamental difficulty of defining and developing "uniform" accounting for diverse economic environments across countries and compare the differences in conditions prevailing in some key markets in Japan and the United States. There are important d...

We study the optimal incentive schemes for multistage projects. Staged financing, pervasive in both venture capital and research funding, arises as a feature of the optimal contract. The nature of progress plays an important role. When progress is tangible, incentives are provided through a series of deadlines and a reward scheme that decreases over time. Early progress in one stage gives the a...

Online payments are a critical issue in electronic markets. This research investigates online payment choices using probit and nested logit model based on the survey data we collected from eBay users. We develop a theoretical framework to model payment choices between the trader partners based on risk, convenience and cost dimensions. Then, we analyze how product attributes, traders’ characteri...

A point repeatedly stressed by transaction cost economics is that the more specific the asset, the more likely is vertical integration to be optimal. In spite of the profusion of empirical papers supporting this prediction, recent surveys and casual observation suggest that higher levels of asset specificity need not always lead to vertical integration. The purpose of this paper is to uncover s...

In two-sided matching markets with contracts, the existence of stable outcomes can be guaranteed only under certain restrictions on preferences; the typical restriction is that all agents’ preferences are substitutable. We show that, in markets with a continuum of each type of agent, it is only necessary that agents on one side of the market have substitutable preferences to guarantee the exist...

Reputation is a valuable asset to firms, yet the impact of corporate governance of reputationreliant firms is underexplored. This paper investigates how a firm’s reputation in the product market responds to a change in its controlling shareholder, and derives the optimal firm ownership and control structure. We consider a dynamic model of an experience-goods firm, in which a controlling shareho...

Networks can have an important effect on economic outcomes. Given the complexity of many of these networks, agents will generally not know their structure. We study the sensitivity of game-theoretic predictions to the specification of players’ (common) prior on the network in a setting where players play a fixed game with their neighbors and only have local information on the network structure....

We develop a model of nonstationary relational contracts in order to study internal wage dynamics. Workers are heterogeneous and each worker’s ability is both private information and fixed for all time. Learning therefore occurs within employment relationships. The inferences, however, are confounded by moral hazard: the distribution of output is determined by both the worker’s type and by his ...

This paper studies the phenomenon of early hiring in entry-level labor markets (e.g. the market for gastroenterology fellowships and the market for judicial clerks) in the presence of social networks. We o¤er a two-stage model in which workers in training institutions reveal information on their own ability over time. In the early stage, workers receive a noisy signal about their own ability. T...