Previous work on trust has focused on employee trust in management. However, issues of how leaders develop trust in their follower in leader-member exchange (LMX) are under-explored. Based on theories of leader-member exchange, attribution and industrial convergence, this study investigates how the work values of leaders influence the development of their trust in followers and how this is mode...

In a bilevel decision problem, the leader at the upper level attempts to optimize his/her objective, the follower at the lower level tries to find an optimized strategy according to each of possible decisions made by the leader. A bilevel decision problem may involve fuzzy demands which appear either in the objective functions or constraints of the leader or the follower or both. Furthermore, t...

When adopted, wildlife protection policies in Canadian forests typically cover large areas and affect multiple economic agents working these landscapes. Such measures are likely to increase the costs of timber for forestry companies operating area, which may hinder their acceptance unless harvesting remains profitable. We propose a bi-level problem that accounts profit-maximizing behavior an ar...

This paper proposes a kind of bi-level linear programming problem, in which there are two decision makers in a hierarchy and they have a common variable. To deal with this bi-level problem, we introduce a virtual decision maker, who controls the common variable to maximize the sum of the objective functions of the upper and lower level decision maker (the leader and follower). To illustrate the...

In a Stackelberg max closure game, we are given digraph whose vertices correspond to projects from which firms can choose and arcs represent precedence constraints. Some under the control of leader who sets prices in first stage while second stage, feasible subset maximum value. For single follower, leader’s problem finding revenue-maximizing be solved strongly polynomial time. this paper, focu...

A decentralized control law using a backstepping scheme is proposed to deal with a leader follower multiple robots structure. Based on graph theory and Laplacian, the coordination strategy combines the leader follower control with the decentralized control. In fact, in the proposed approach, each follower robot only needs the information exchange with its connected neighbors and does not assume...

Game theory is a useful tool for reasoning about interactions between agents and in turn aiding in the decisions of those agents. In fact, Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications such as oligopolistic markets and security domains. Indeed, Stackelberg games are at the heart of three deployed systems, ARMOR; IRIS; and GUARDS, for aiding security officials in making cr...

We carry out experiments on the Stackelberg game and the second-play Stackelberg game where the leader can revise his decision after the follower has decided. In the second-play Stackelberg game, the leader’s first announcement is cheap talk. The game settings studied include fixed pairs and random matching, and settings where the follower’s information about the leader’s payoffs is complete or...

In order to balance the interests of integrated energy operator (IEO) and users, a novel Stackelberg game-based optimization framework is proposed for optimal scheduling demand response (IDR)-enabled systems with uncertain renewable generations, where IEO acts as leader who pursues maximization his profits by setting prices, while users are follower adjusts consumption plans minimize their cost...

The interactions between attackers and network administrator are modeled as a non-cooperative non-zero-sum dynamic game with incomplete information, which considers the uncertainty and the special properties of multi-stage attacks. The model is a Fictitious Play approach along a special game tree when the attacker is the leader and the administrator is the follower. Multi-objective optimization...