Different social planners may have different opinions on the wellbeing of individuals under different social options (Roberts, 1980). If utilities are translationor ratio-scale measurable, or if the social ranking might be incomplete, or if interplanner comparability is allowed; then there exists non-dictatorial aggregation rules. We propose extensions, intersections, and mixtures of the Pareto...

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that Arrow’s axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that a domain restriction can be imposed and completeness can be dropped ...

This article investigates how speakers and hearers who are referentially clear are designated anaphorically in Mandarin face-to-face conversation. Although anaphoric production involves both structural and functional factors, it is proposed that functional demands, which include social needs and pragmatic requirements, are the crucial determinants that decide the surface manifestations of anaph...

Il existait au Moyen-âge des pensées profondes et raffinées du choix social, surtout chez Ramon Llull, (ca 1232-1316) et Nicolaus Krebs, surnommé ‘de Cusa’ ou ‘Cusanus’ (1401-64). Deux règles fondamentales du choix social moderne, c'est-à-dire celles de Copeland (généralisation de la règle de Condorcet) et de Borda, ont été proposées par Llull et Cusanus plusieurs siècles avant l'«âge d'or» du ...

We consider a dynamic collective choice problem where a large number of players are cooperatively choosing between multiple destinations while being influenced by the behavior of the group. For example, in a robotic swarm exploring a new environment, a robot might have to choose between multiple sites to visit, but at the same time it should remain close to the group to achieve some coordinated...

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situations, when information about voters' preferences is complete, the voters' preferences on alternatives induce voters' preferences over the set of available voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of ch...

A collaborative group is commonly defined as a set of agents, which share information and coordinate activities while working towards a common goal. How do groups decide which are their common goals and what to intend? According to the much cited theory of Cohen and Levesque, an agent intends g if it has chosen to pursue goal g and it has committed itself to making g happen. Following the same ...

Designers of human computation systems often face the need to aggregate noisy information provided by multiple people. While voting is often used for this purpose, the specific voting methods that are employed are typically naı̈ve. The theory of social choice provides powerful tools for exactly these settings. We conduct experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk which demonstrate empirically that mo...

Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem in social choice theory is remarkable for being at once both definitive and inscrutable. It seems to disallow a rational procedure for collective choice without suggesting practical ways to reduce the probability or magnitude of the problem. To shed light on this issue, and considering the difficulties of recreating real-world political dynamics in the lab,...