This paper describes a novel auction mechanism for Internet connections comprising several individual links. Whereas Generalized Vickrey Auctions are already well-established for the case of single links, multi-link connections pose additional problems being related both to establishing and afterwards maintaining the connection. Based on two recent auction scheme proposals, we demonstrate how t...

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and the firms have private information. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. At the auction each firm anticipates his role in the secondary mark...

In a unit-demand multi-unit multi-item auction, an auctioneer is selling a collection of different items to a set of agents each interested in buying at most unit. Each agent has a different private value for each of the items. We consider the problem of designing a truthful auction that maximizes the auctioneer’s profit in this setting. Previously, there has been progress on this problem in th...

This paper proposes an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when the seller is restricted to sell bundles whose elements form a basis of a matroid and agents have interdependent values. This ascending auction generalizes Bikhchandani et al. (2011) who assume agents have independent private values; and Perry and Reny (2005) who study multi-unit good auctions. The key feature of the...

We study two standard multi-unit auction formats for allocating multiple units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. The first one is the Discriminatory Auction, which charges every winner his winning bids. The second is the Uniform Price Auction, which determines a uniform price to be paid per unit. Variants of both formats find applications ranging from the allocation of state bonds to in...

We study two standard multi-unit auction formats for allocating multiple units of asingle good to multi-demand bidders. The first one is the Discriminatory Auction, whichcharges every winner his winning bids. The second is the Uniform Price Auction, whichdetermines a uniform price to be paid per unit. Variants of both formats find applicationsranging from the allocation of s...

Electronic auction has introduced new processes in the way auction is conducted which require investigation to ensure compliancy to Sharia (Islamic principles that are based on Qur’an and Sunnah) rules. The use of mobile software agent in electronic auction marketplaces adds ubiquity power to the bidders. In particular it allows agents to quicker respond to local changes in auction marketplaces...

. Market-based Iterative Risk Allocation MIRA A , # , " # # " # , # # $ # , # " + , " " $ . # " # A # , " # $ < , " # , " # , # , # $ < # # risk allocation '8( " T# # , A $ < + A # , " " A , # # A $ . T# # A # " # " !# t tonnement A Walrasian auction $ # A , # = # T# # $ . # # " " $

We consider a setting where there is a manufacturer who wants to procure multiple items from a set of suppliers each of whom can supply one or more of these items (bundles). We design an ascending price auction for such a setting which implements the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcome and truthful bidding is an ex post Nash equilibrium. Our auction maintains non-linear and non-anonymous prices throu...