This contribution discusses Leibniz’s conception of faith and its relation to reason. It shows that, for Leibniz, faith embraces both cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions: although it must be grounded in reason, it is not merely reasonable belief. Moreover, for Leibniz, a truth of faith (like any truth) can never be contrary to reason but can be above the limits of comprehension of human reas...

Computers and Thought are the two categories that together de ne Arti cial Intelligence as a discipline. It is generally accepted that work in Arti cial Intelligence over the last thirty years has had a strong in uence on aspects of computer architectures. In this paper we also make the converse claim; that the state of computer architecture has been a strong in uence on our models of thought. ...

This paper explains what it is to believe something for a reason. I argue that you believe something for a reason just in case the reason non-deviantly causes your belief. In the course of arguing for my thesis, I present a new argument that reasons are causes and offer an informative account of causal non-deviance.

This paper describes the construction of a general-purpose defeasible reasoner that is complete for first-order logic and provably adequate for the argument-based conception of defeasible reasoning that I have developed elsewhere. Because the set of warranted conclusions for a defeasible reasoner will not generally be recursively enumerable, a defeasible reasoner based upon a rich logic like th...

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