This paper studies the incentive effects of a balanced scorecard within a multitask agency framework under both formal and relational contracts. First, the main characteristics of the balanced scorecard are analyzed with respect to performance measure congruity. It is shown that under complete verifiability, a properly designed balanced scorecard is capable of perfectly aligning the interests o...

The outsourcing of Information Technology (IT) services is a practice generally regulated by contracts. Since contracts are inevitably incomplete, buyer-supplier relationships are usually managed by additional mechanisms of incentives and governance, which results in a variety of success levels. Buyer perceived volatility and ambiguity of the future relationship are argued to be keys in definin...

This paper critiques blockchain-based “smart contracts,” which aim to automatically and securely execute obligations without reliance on a centralized enforcement authority. Though smart contracts do have some features that might serve the goals of social justice and fairness, I suggest that they are based on a thin conception of what law does, and how it does it. Smart contracts focus on the t...

Introduction Integrated care systems as well as accountable care organisations (ACOs) in the US and similar concepts in other countries are advocated as an effective method of improving the performance of healthcare systems. These systems outline a payment and care delivery model that intends to tie provider reimbursements to predefined quality metrics. By this the total costs of care shall be ...

This paper presents new evidence on the role of embeddedness in predicting contract duration in the context of Information Technology (IT) Outsourcing. Contract duration is a strategic decision that aligns interests of clients and vendors, providing the benefits of business continuity to clients and incentives to undertake relationship specific investments for vendors. Considering the salience ...