I consider an alternating offer bargaining game which is played by a risk neutral buyer and seller, where the value of the good to be traded follows a Markov process. For these games the existence of a perfect equilibrium is proved and the set of equilibrium payoffs and strategies are characterised. The main results are: (a) If the buyer is less patient than the seller, then there will be delay...

On-line commercial transactions involve an inherent mistrust between participant parties since, sometimes, no previous relation exists between them. Such mistrust may be a deadlock point in a trade transaction where the buyer does not want to perform the payment until the seller sends the good and the seller does not want to do so until the buyer pays for the purchase. In this paper we present ...

This paper provides background, positioning, and related insights around a recent technological development in B2B e-commerce known as XML-based Interorganizational Systems (IOS). Specifically, the University of Illinois has developed a Co-Adoption Model of XML-based IOS. The theoretical model is developed to empirically evaluate the influential factors leading to adoption and internal diffusio...

This article serves as the second part in a two-part series that provides an overview of the reverse auction concept, building on the best research in the field of supply chain management. In this instalment, we look at the concerns involved in making reverse auctions work in practice – the implementation issues. Frist, we look at when reverse auctions should – and should not – be utilized by a...

Lead time is one of the major limits that affect planning at every stage of the supply chain system. In this paper, we study a continuous review inventory model. This paper investigates the ordering cost reductions are dependent on lead time. This study addressed two-echelon supply chain problem consisting of a single vendor and a single buyer. The main contribution of this study is that the in...

We give a new approach in modeling the incomplete information in a buyer-seller game. We assume that the seller does not know the buyer's utility function at all. Usually the problem is solved by determining the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, where it is assumed that the buyer's utility function has only some parameters unknown to the seller, and the seller knows the distribution of the...

Most supplier selection models consider the buyer’s viewpoint and maximize only the buyer’s profit. This does not necessarily lead to an optimal situation for all the members of a supply chain. Coordination models have been developed to optimize the entire supply chain and align the decisions between its entities. Little research has been done on the application of these models in the supplier ...

This paper provides background, positioning, and related insights around a recent technological development in B2B ecommerce known as XML-based interorganizational systems (IOS). Specifically, a Co-Adoption Model of XMLbased IOS is introduced and defined. The theoretical model is developed to empirically evaluate the influential factors leading to adoption and internal diffusion (volume, divers...

We consider a simple bilateral trading game between a seller and a buyer who have private valuations for an indivisible good. The seller makes a price o¤er which the buyer can either accept or reject. If the seller can observe the valuation of the buyer (if information is symmetric), then the trading outcome is trivially e¢ cient. If the seller can not observe the valuation (if information is a...

We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion framework in a finite horizon setting consisting of a Seller and a Buyer. The Seller wishes to persuade the Buyer to buy a durable good at a given price by providing information about its relevance (match quality). The Buyer has private information about his valuation for a good match and we study optimal dynamic information policies employed by the Seller...