The sequential auction problem is commonplace in open, electronic marketplaces such as eBay. This problem occurs when a buyer faces a complex strategic problem in bidding across multiple auctions, each selling similar or essentially identical items and when the buyer would have a simple, truth-revealing strategy if there was but a single auction event. Our model allows for multiple, distinct go...

This paper investigates the e¤ects of entry in two-sided markets where buyers and sellers act strategically. Applying new tools from supermodular optimization/games, su¢ cient conditions for di¤erent comparative statics results are obtained. While normality of one good is su¢ cient for the equilibrium price to be increasing in the number of buyers, normality of both goods is required for equili...

We study the regulation of brokerage in wholesale markets premodern Central Western Europe. Examining 1,804 sets rules from 82 cities, we find was primarily a centralized matchmaking mechanism. Brokerage more common towns with larger populations, better access to sea ports and trade routes, greater political autonomy. Brokers' fee structures varied systematically: price-based fees were for high...

Abstract: For logistics centers the disposition and dispatch of goods has reached a high standard of automation. However, the trucks and trailers bringing and taking the goods are driven manually. This can at least be improved for the non-public traffic in the scope of logistics centers by autonomous forward and backward motion control for standard transportation vehicles. By an experimental sy...

Combinatorial auction is an auction such that multiple goods are available and bidders can post bids for subsets of the goods. An auction mechanism is composed of a goods allocation rule and a payment scheme, which balance the goal of maximizing the sellers’ revenue and encouraging truthful declaration of bidders. The original Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) allocates the goods by maximizing ...

Price Competition and Reputation in Markets for Experience Goods: An Experimental Study* We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for experience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the endogenous oligopoly and monopoly prices)....

The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services Credence goods markets suffer from inefficiencies arising from informational asymmetries between expert sellers and customers. While standard theory predicts that inefficiencies disappear if customers can verify the quality received, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous price...

This paper describes IVAN (Integrated Virtual Agent Network), a project that proposes to improve online marketplaces, specifically those that involve the trading of nontangible goods and services. IVAN is an intermediary architecture intended as a generalized platform for the specification and brokering of heterogeneous goods and services. IVAN makes it possible for both buyers and sellers alik...

The overwhelming options conveyed by Internet exaggerated growth bring new issues for users engaged in buying and/or selling goods using the net as the business medium. Goods and services can be exchanged, directly sold or negotiated in auctions. In any of these situations, finding the required product by the right price is the big challenge for Internet users. Especially in e-auction, timing a...

dynamic economic load dispatch is one of the most important roles of power generation’s operation and control. it determines the optimal controls of production of generator units with predicted load demand over a certain period of time. economic dispatch at minimum production cost is one of the most important subjects in the power network’s operation, which is a complicated nonlinear constraine...