This paper analyzes collective choices in a society with strategic voters and single-crossing preferences. It shows that, in addition to single-peakedness, single-crossingness is another meaningful domain which guarantees the existence of non-manipulable social choice functions. A social choice function is shown to be anonymous, unanimous and strategy-proof on single-crossing domains if and onl...

For the past few years, several big companies have taken actions to gain more control over their supply chains. Against the popular trend of outsourcing, they tend to go back to gain a higher level of vertical integration. Just as outsourcing once raised challenges to global management, the revival of vertical integration sure brings benefits as well as new challenges. Motivated by this recent ...

The robustness of the Bayes–Nash equilibrium prediction for seller revenue in auctions is investigated. In a framework of interdependent valuations generated from independent signals, seller expected revenue may fall well below the equilibrium prediction, even though the individual payoff consequences of suboptimal bidding may be small for each individual bidder. This possibility would be relev...