The solution is given here for the infinitely repeated two-person zero-sum,games of inr complete information characterized by 2 X 2 games, with information matrxces b for the ftrst game and( b ab)for the second game.

We consider two populations co-evolving with fitness defined by the payoff in a two-person zero-sum game. We show that such situations lead to spontaneous and sustained oscillations iff the optimal strategy of the game is mixed.

The function that assigns to each matrix game (i.e., the mixed extension of a finite zero-sum two-player game) its value is axiomatized by a number of intuitive properties.

The long-standing problem of giving fully abstract semantics to the nu-calculus have been solved only recently with game models à la Hyland-Ong in the universe of Fraenkel-Mostowski sets. However, these models are still quite complicated, mainly because they aim to ensure at once both the equivariance of strategies, and the possibility of having strategies generating new names. In this paper, w...

The game of darts has enjoyed great growth over the past decade with perception moving from that a pub to is regularly scheduled on prime-time television in many countries such as United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, and Australia, among others. It involves strategic interactions between two players, but date, literature ignored these interactions. In this paper, we formulate solve dynamic zer...

We show that even when the information structure is independent of the state of nature, the value of the n-stage zero-sum game with incomplete information is not necessarily monotonic with respect to the length of the game. More precisely, we give an example of such an n-stage game in which v~>v~<v~.

In this paper we present a Nash equilibrium problem of linear quadratic zero-sum dynamic games for descriptor system. We assume that the players give a linear feedback to the game. For the game with finite planning horizon we derive a differential Riccati type equation. For the game with infinite planning horizon we consider an algebraic Riccati type equation. The connection of the game solutio...

In this document we provide a couple of exercises that help understand the basic concepts of game theory, including pure and mixed strategies, zero sum and non-zero sum games, and saddle-point and Nash solutions. The definition for concepts and the ideas for these exercises were taken in part from [1, 2]. Before we start, let us introduce some notation. We are going to assume that we have only ...