We analyze a principal-supervisor-two-agent hierarchy with inefficient supervision. The supervisor may collect an incorrect signal on the agents' effort levels. When reporting to principal, collude one or both agents manipulate in exchange for bribe. In hierarchy, we identify new trade-off between supervision and supervisor-agent collusion: Due supervisory signal, truthfully under collusion pro...

conclusions following cabg, the most severity of pain was reported at surgical incision on time t2. pain began to decrease from the third day following the operation. age, sex and bmi along with operation-related factors such as duration of cbp or chest tube drainage may affect the pain pattern following cabg surgery. patients and methods the present study was conducted on 138 patients who unde...

Effects of supervisor and supervisee theoretical orientation on supervisees' perceptions of supervisors' models, roles, and foci were studied, as were variables influencing quality of supervision and supervisee autonomy. Interns (N = 84) from 32 nationwide training sites were surveyed. Cognitive-behavioral supervisors were perceived to be in a consultant role and to focus on skills and strategi...

The current Internet architecture was designed as a mean of connecting pairs of hosts and allow them to reliably exchange packets. The way we use it every day deeply changed from pure communication to (mostly) content distribution. The wish to fill the gap between the underlying architecture and the information-centric nature of the current Internet traffic has inspired many new architectures w...

The degree of association between supervisor and subordinate perceptions of the supervisor's leadership style, use of power by the supervisor, and the supervisor's conflict-management style was studied in 87 organizational units representing five service-oriented organizations. The ability of the supervisors' and subordinates' perceptions, individually and jointly, and the discrepancy between t...

We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. We assume that the supervisor and the agent can collude while interacting with the principal. As long as the supervisor is symmetrically informed with the agent, the former’s existence does not improve the principal’s rent extraction. This is due to the coalitional efficiency between the supervisor and the agent. However,...