Coalition formation is an important capability for automated negotiation among self-interested agents. In order for coalitions to be stable, a key question that must be answered is how the gains from cooperation are to be distributed. Coalitional game theory provides a number of solution concepts for this. However, recent research has revealed that these traditional solution concepts are vulner...

We examine the characterization of the Shapley value that was introduced by Young and refined later by Neyman. A new proof of this axioma-tization is given and as an illustration of the new proof it is demonstrated that the axioms under consideration characterize the Shapley value on various well-known classes of T U games.

Feature attributions based on the Shapley value are popular for explaining machine learning models. However, their estimation is complex from both theoretical and computational standpoints. We disentangle this complexity into two main factors: approach to removing feature information tractable strategy. These factors provide a natural lens through which we can better understand compare 24 disti...

In Briata, Dall’Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by Knaster (1946). In this paper we analyze the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of the game and propose its use as a measure of the players’ attitude towards coll...

Shapley value is a popular way to compute payoffs in cooperative games where the agents are assumed to have deterministic, risk-neutral (linear) utilities.This paper explores a class of Multi-agent constantsum cooperative games where the payoffs are random variables. We introduce a new model based on Borch’s Theorem from the actuarial world of re-insurance, to obtain a Pareto optimal allocation...