In order to analyse the stability of cartel structures in a Cournot oligopoly, I propose a noncooperative game of coalition formation in which any group of firms can induce a dismantling deviation such that each member is in a smaller cartel in the resulting structure. It is required that a deviation only occurs if it is robust against further dismantling deviation. I characterise the set of st...

The paper studies insurance with moral hazard in a system of contingent-claims markets. Insurance buyers are modelled as Cournot monopolists or oligopolists. The other agents condition their expectations on market prices, as in models of rational-expectations equilibrium with asymmetric information. Thereby they correctly anticipate accident probabilities corresponding to effort incentives indu...

I study the incentives of oligopolists to acquire and disclose information on a common demand intercept. Since firms may fail to acquire information even when they invest in information acquisition, firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news while disclosing favorable news. Firms may earn higher expected profits under such a selective disclosure regime than under the regimes where firms commit...

A game with single-valued best-replies and a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game if and only if the sequential best-reply dynamics converge (Cournot stability). If the PSNE is not unique, convergence to the set of equilibria is still ensured. It follows, for example, that (a) any strictly quasi-concave supermodular game with a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game, (b) any strictly ...

Guirao and Rubio [6] introduces an economic model, which generalizes the classical duopoly of Cournot type, where the competitors are located around a circle or a line and each rm competes à la Cournot with its right and left neighboring. For the case of having three and four players we describe completely the bifurcations of equilibria in terms of the production costs of each rm and we study t...

برای دستیابی به مزیت رقابتی در شرایط عدم‌­اطمینان که آن تغییر ضروری است، یکی از چالش‌های بزرگ سازمان‌ها کاهش ریسک طریق ایجاد زنجیره‌های تأمین تاب‌آور است. تاب‌آوری زنجیره ‌تأمین توانایی مقابله با اختلال اشاره دارد یک رویداد غیرقابل‌پیش‌بینی بوده و دارای منابع داخلی خارجی مختلفی ازجمله بلایای طبیعی ریسک‌های عملیاتی پژوهش حاضر شبیه‌سازی توسط نرم‌افزار ارنا زنجیره‌ سنگ ساختمانی «کارخانه سنگبری آسم...

This paper examines the strategic use of debt financing in a quantity-setting duopoly with asymmetric costs. Before output competition (Cournot or Stackelberg) demand uncertainty takes place, both firms can strategically choose to issue commit an aggressive stance. We find that debt, serving as commitment device, help disadvantaged firm ( i.e. , high-cost Cournot follower Stackelberg competitio...