This paper seeks to encompass elements of both the Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) approaches to optimal capital structure within a unified framework with shadow costs of incomplete information. Making the most of the major work of Merton (1987), Leland (1996, 1998) and Bellalah (2001a), we put forward a model that reflects the interaction of financing decision...

This paper presents a model of investment timing by risk averse managers facing incomplete markets and corporate control. Managers are exposed to idiosyncratic risks due to the dependence of their compensation on investment payoffs which are not spanned by other assets. We show that risk averse managers invest earlier than welldiversified shareholders would prefer, leading to significant agency...

Background Globally, flexible work arrangements - through the use of temporary nursing staff - are an important strategy for dealing with nursing shortages in hospitals. Objective The objective of the study was to determine the direct and indirect costs of agency nurses, as well as the advantages and the problems associated with agency nurse utilisation in two public sector hospitals in South A...

Corporations use a variety of processes to allocate capital. This paper studies the benefits and costs of several common budget procedures from the perspective of a model with agency and information problems. Processes that delegate aspects of the decision to the agent result in too many projects being approved, while processes in which the principal retains the right to reject projects cause t...

The Welfare Effects of Globalization with Labor Market Regulation I examine how globalization affects wages and welfare in a general equilibrium model of international trade with partly oligopolistic markets. Globalization is modeled as reducing trade costs or opening up shielded sectors to trade. There is a national or international common agency that determines minimum wages for the oligopoli...

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms’ equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the mo...

An exploratory home health care (HHC) cost-function model is estimated using State rate-setting data for the 74 traditional (nonprofit) Connecticut agencies. The analysis demonstrates U-shaped average costs curves for agencies' provision of skilled nursing visits, with substantial diseconomies of scale in the observable range. It is determined from the estimated cost function that the sample re...

This paper studies the effect of credit market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, on the agency costs of debt finance. The threshold of obtaining loan finance is shown to be independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier, while intensified credit market competition leads to lower lending rates and investment return distributions with lower, but less risky ret...

journal of accounting advances (j.a.a) vol. 2, no. 2, fall & winter 2010, ser. 59/3     extended abstract   an investigation of agency theory and signaling theory in dividend policies: the role of institutional investors   dr. g. r. karami         dr. s. mehrani               h. eskandar tehran university   introduction        dividend has a special position among decision makers. dividend poli...