However, this problem can be fixed by requiring active substitutions be defined on the base sort only (see, for instance, [2]). The purpose of this note is to supply a proof for the theorem. In the original semantics in [1], the use of structural equivalence introduces the nondeterminism, which makes it difficult to write a rigorous proof. To overcome the difficulty we shall use intermediate se...

Protocols for the protected execution of programs,like those based on a hardware root of trust, will become offundamental importance for computer security. In parallel tosuch protocols, there is therefore a need to develop models andtools that allow formal specification and automated verificationof the desired security properties. Still, current protocols lackrealistic m...

We present a graphical semantics for the pi-calculus, that is easier to visualize and better suited to expressing causality and temporal properties than conventional relational semantics. A pi-chart is a finite directed acyclic graph recording a computation in the pi-calculus. Each node represents a process, and each edge either represents a computation step, or a message-passing interaction. P...

We study the correspondence between a concurrent lambda-calculus in administrative, continuation passing style and a pi-calculus and we derive a termination result for the latter.

This work exploits the logical foundation of session types to determine what kind of type discipline for the pi-calculus can exactly capture, and is captured by, lambda-calculus behaviours. Leveraging the proof theoretic content of the soundness and completeness of sequent calculus and natural deduction presentations of linear logic, we develop the first mutually inverse and fully abstract proc...

We formally study two privacy-type properties in online auction protocols, bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness. These properties are formalised as observational equivalences in the applied π calculus. We analyse the receipt-free auction protocol by Abe and Suzuki. Bidding-price-secrecy of the protocol is verified using ProVerif, whereas receipt-freeness of the protocol is proved manually.