We introduce the notion of type-symmetric randomized equilibrium (TSRE) by requiring those agents with the same type of characteristics to choose the same randomized choice. Such a notion provides a generic micro-foundation for the macro notion of equilibrium distribution, as used in the literature on games and economies with many agents. In particular, we show that if the space of agents is mo...

This paper presents a Heterogeneous Agent Model of a financial market with chartist and fundamentalist traders that exhibit bounded rationality and short-term thinking to explain the effect of under and overreaction to news. The existence of the Market Maker’s finite price adjustment speed and the presence of risk aversion lead to the fact that prices do not adjust instantaneously to new inform...

This paper investigates a Trejos-Wright random matching model of money with a consumer take-it-or-leave-it offer and with individual money holdings in the set {0, 1, 2}. It is shown that three kinds of monetary steady states exist generically: (1) purestrategy full-support steady states, (2) mixed-strategy full-support steady states, and (3) non-full-support steady states. A full-support steady...

All the residues of the title compound, (C(2)H(5.5)NO(2))(2)[ReO(4)], are located in general crystallographic positions. The glycine mol-ecules have usual conformations [Rodrigues Matos Beja et al. (2006 ▶). Acta Cryst. C62, o71-o72] with the H atom of the carboxylate group half-occupied, thus bearing a formal half-positive charge per molecule. The perrhenate anion has nearly ideal tetra-hedral...

This paper presents a method that permits to estimate the power consumption of components in the AADL component assembly model, once deployed onto components in the AADL target platform model. This estimation is performed at different levels in the AADL refinement process. Multi-level power models have been specifically developed for the different type of possible hardware targets: General Purp...

Consider a model of location choice by two sorts of agents, called “buyers”and “sellers:”In the first period agents simultaneously choose between two identical possible locations; following this, the agents at each location play some sort of game with the other agents there. Buyers prefer locations with fewer other buyers and more sellers, and sellers have the reverse preferences. We study the ...

We introduce the concept of a Misspecification Equilibrium to dynamic macroeconomics. A Misspecification Equilibrium occurs in a stochastic process when agents forecast optimally given that they must choose from a list of misspecified econometric models. With appropriate restrictions on the asymptotic properties of the exogeneous process and on the feedback of expectations, the Misspecification...

This paper generalizes existence results on first-order Stochastic Consistent Expectations Equilibria (SCEE) obtained by (Hommes, Sorger, and Wagener 2002). We present a stochastic non-linear self-referential model in which expectations are based on linear perceptions. In an SCEE the sample mean and correlation coefficients of the true and perceived processes coincide. We provide conditions on ...

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from ‘satisfying’ blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we estab...

Under the assumption of bounded rationality, economic agents learn from their past mistaken predictions by combining new and old information to form new beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the policy-maker, by affecting private agents’ learning process, determines the speed at which the economy converges to the rational expectation equilibrium. I find that by reacting stron...