We study competition in a supply chain where multiple manufacturers compete in quantities to supply a set of products to multiple risk-averse retailers who compete in quantities to satisfy the uncertain consumer demand. For the symmetric supply chain, we give closed-form expressions for the unique equilibrium. We find that, provided there is a sufficiently large number of manufacturers and reta...

Li [1] examined the incentives for information sharing in a two-level supply chain in which there are a manufacturer and many competing retailers. Li showed that direct and leakage effects of information sharing discourage retailers from sharing their information and identified conditions under which demand information sharing can be traded. The purpose of this note is to show that full informa...

We consider a buyer who outsources the manufacturing of a product to multiple symmetric make-to-stock suppliers who compete on price and service (fill rate). The buyer allocates demand to the suppliers using a score function with an exponential form, which specifies the relative importance of price vs. service, in order to minimize his costs, while the suppliers choose their prices and fill rat...

This paper studies coordination and competition issues in a closed-loop supply chain. The supply chain consists of two competing manufacturers who collect the used-product for remanufacturing through a common retailer. We obtain the optimal wholesale prices, and the optimal fraction of collection for the two cases: case1 (uncoordinated system) and case2 (channel-coordinated system). Furthermore...

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers competing in quantities. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier generally prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers’ equilibri...

W e analyze contracting behaviors in a two-tier supply chain system consisting of competing manufacturers and competing retailers. We contrast the contracting outcome of a Stackelberg game, in which the manufacturers offer take-itor-leave-it contracts to the retailers, with that of a bargaining game, in which the firms bilaterally negotiate contract terms via a process of alternating offers. Th...

This paper considers tripartite games in a dual-channel supply chain which involves manufacturer, an offline retailer and online retailer. Both competition cooperation issues are analyzed. In the model, Stackelberg game between manufacturer two retailers Bertrand occur simultaneously. It is shown that channel attracts more consumers’ purchase preference charged higher wholesale price it meanwhi...