We combine the newest concepts of non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We consider three coalition games that allow for the formation of multiple coalitions. The coalition games represent different designs of climate treaty protoc...

This paper surveys and analyzes the state of the art of buyer coalition mechanisms, paying attention to single item and bundle of items aspects. From the exits buyer coalition schemes, the solution concepts of their mechanisms are concerned with are related to both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. Finally, we conclude by discussing the future directions of buyer coalition mechanisms.

A coalition is a congenital bony, cartilaginous, or fibrous connection (called a bar) between two or more bones. Coalitions are clinically significant because they prevent normal joint motion. Tarsal coalition may be difficult to identify on clinical and imaging evaluation. Given the high prevalence of coalition, radiologists must be alert to the often subtle imaging findings.

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

We introduce a value for NTU games with coalition structure. This value coincides with the consistent value for trivial coalition structures, and with the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure. Furthermore, we present two characterizations: the first one using a consistency property and the second one using balanced contributions’ properties.

Pure bargaining games discussed in the previous two lectures are a special case of n-person cooperative games. In the general setup coalitions other than the grand coalition matter as well. The primitive is the coalitional form (or, "coalitional function", or "characteristic form"). The primitive can represent many different things, e.g., a simple voting game where we associate to a winning coa...

One key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability. A coalition in such games is stable when no subset of the agents in it has a rational incentive to leave the coalition. Finding a division of the gains of the coalition (an imputation) lies at the heart of many cooperative game theory solution concepts, the most prominent of which is the core. However, some coalitiona...

We consider classes of hedonic games in which each player’s preferences over coalition structures are induced by the best player (Band B-hedonic games) or the worst player (Wand W-hedonic games) in his coalition. For these classes, which allow for concise representation, we analyze the computational complexity of deciding the existence of and computing individually stable, Nash stable, and indi...

We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in a public good mechanism and study which Nash equilibria are achieved through the cooperative behavior of agents. The participation game may have multiple Nash equilibria, and various numbers of participants may be attained at the Nash equilibria. We provide sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium of the participation ga...

(;ell-satisfaction in multi-agent environments via coalition formation may be beneficial in cases where agents cannot perform goals by themselves or they do so inefficiently. Agent coalition forn|alkm typically requires that each agent must be a member of only Olle coalition. This may lead to wasted resources alld capabilities. Therefore, we. present algorithms that lead agents to the formation...