© 2009 Guopeng Zhang et al. 89 ABSTRACT⎯This letter considers the problem of resource sharing among a relay and multiple user nodes in cooperative transmission networks. We formulate this problem as a sellers’ market competition and use a noncooperative game to jointly consider the benefits of the relay and the users. We also develop a distributed algorithm to search the Nash equilibrium, the s...

n Abstract: In this paper we analyze two natural convexity definitions for cooperative bankruptcy games, one of them was introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985). In particular, we show that convexity in the sense of increasing marginal contributions is not satisfied by the game introduced by these authors. Furthermore, we propose an alternative game that captures the situation of bankruptcy pr...

I introduce cooperative product games (CPGs), a cooperative game where every player has a weight, and the value of a coalition is the product of the weights of the players in the coalition. I only look at games where the weights are at least 2. I show that no player in such a game can be a dummy. I show that the game is convex, and therefore always has a non-empty core. I provide a simple metho...

This is the first draft of the entry “Game Theory” to appear in the Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Science (edited by Ian Jarvie & Jesús Zamora Bonilla), Part III, Chapter 16.

This paper studies the behavior coordination of members in e-commerce supply chains with cooperative game theory. Under the environment of e-commerce, the retailers and the supplier can maximize their profits through the cooperation with the information provider. We study this cooperation by means of cooperative game theory and emphasize the importance of the information provider in the coopera...

Game Theory has proven to be a useful tool for modelling decision problems in competitive and collaborative environments. Cooperative games, in turn, promote the bargaining and the formation of coalitions, and deals with problems as the redistribution of gained payo between members of coalitions. This paper introduces the concept of indistinguishability among players, providing constructive met...

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target ca...

The compromise value is introduced for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is, for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. It is a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights. This solution concept is based on the compromise value for NTU games and the τ -value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty core of a game is bounded by th...

This study was done as a part of a larger research project where the interest was on exploring if and how gameplay design could give informative principles to the design of educational activities. The researchers conducted a series of studies trying to map game mechanics that had the special quality of being inclusive, i.e., playable by a diverse group of players. This specific study focused on...

My primary research interest is social behavior of software agents acting in general-sum normal form games. In an environment with another agent, an agent needs to be able to identify if the opponent is hostile or cooperative by looking at the opponent’s actions, and respond appropriately. If the opponent is hostile, the agent should guard against it. Even for a self-interested agent, cooperati...