We introduce Weakest Link Games (WLGs), a cooperative game modeling domains where a team’s value is determined by its weakest member. The game is represented as an edgeweighted graph with designated source and target vertices, where agents are the edges. The quality of a path between the source vertex and target vertex is the minimal edge weight along the path; the value of a coalition of edges...

We study two forms of a symmetric cooperative game played by three players, one classical and other quantum. In its classical form making a coalition gives advantage to players and they are motivated to do so. However in its quantum form the advantage is lost and players are left with no motivation to make a coalition.

MC-nets constitute a natural compact representation scheme for cooperative games in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the complexity of several natural computational problems that concern solution concepts such as the core, the least core and the nucleolus. We characterize the complexity of these problems for a variety of subclasses of MC-nets, also considering constraints on the game...

Cooperative games under combinatorial restrictions are cooperative games in which the players have restricted communication possibilities, which are defined by a combinatorial structure. This paper provides a “ready-to-apply” procedure to compute the Shapley-Shubik index power of games restricted by combinatorial structures. These restrictions are determined by the positions of the players in a...

A game on a convex geometry was introduced by Bilbao as a model of partial cooperation. We investigate some properties of the core of a game on a convex geometry. First, we show that if a game is quasi-convex, then the core is stable. This result can be seen as an extension of a result by Shapley for traditional cooperative games. Secondly, we show the core on the class of balanced games on a c...

The paper analyses non-cooperative behaviour in a two-echelon decentralized supply chain, composed of one supplier and n retailers. For sufficient supply from the supplier, we build the approximate decision model of their base stock level, in which the suppliers reactions are not considered, and its non-cooperative behaviour is obtained. For insufficient supply from the supplier, much more comp...

In most previous models of coalition structure generation, it is assumed that agents may partition themselves into any coalition structure. In practice, however, there may be physical and organizational constraints that limit the number of co-existing coalitions. In this paper, we introduce k-coalitional games: a type of partition function game especially designed to model such situations. We p...

We present here a pricing model which is an extension of the Cooperative Game concept andwhich includes a notion of Price-Dependent Demand.We present some existence results as well as some algorithms, and conclude by discussing a specific problem related to Network Pricing. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

We present and formally investigate Cooperative Boolean Games, a new, natural family of coalitional games that are both compact and expressive. In such a game, an agent’s primary aim is to achieve its individual goal, which is represented as a propositional logic formula over some set of Boolean variables. Each agent is assumed to exercise unique control over some subset of the overall set of B...

The process towards an establishment of international environmental agreements as the implementation of the Kyoto protocol comprises enormous effort of international negotiation and bargaining policies and strategies. International cooperative negotiation solutions can be reached if all negotiation partner and player expect improved results in comparison to a non cooperative approach and indepe...