Moore and Repullo [Subgame perfect implementation, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1191–1220], and Abreu and Sen [Subgame perfect implementation: a necessary and almost sufficient condition, J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990) 285–299] introduce distinct necessary and sufficient conditions for SPE implementation, when the number of players is at least three. This paper closes the gap between the conditions—a comp...

On the Escalation and De-Escalation of Conflict We introduce three variations of the Hirshleifer-Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and high...

We investigate the welfare effects of policies that increase voter turnout in costly voting models. In a generalized costly voting model, we show that if the electorate is sufficiently large, then increasing voter turnout is generically efficient. Increasing turnout in small elections is only inefficient if the electorate is evenly divided or if there is already almost complete voter participat...

This paper shows that government anti-smoking campaign can benefit the government in the political bargaining with the tobacco industry by reducing the latter's alternative welfare. Although the equilibrium regulation on the tobacco industry increases as a result of government anti-smoking campaign, the political contribution from the tobacco industry will not necessarily go down. Anti-smoking ...

The number of Internet news media outlets has grown rapidly in recent years. This paper analyzes the effects of media proliferation on electoral outcomes and social welfare. We assume voters are information-seeking but choose outlets that are excessively partisan given the voters’ own ideological preferences, due to quasi-rationality. We find that if voters who think (correctly or not) that the...

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preference...

We find that, across OECD countries, there is a strong link between the rate of self employment and the intensity of both productand labor-market regulations. The sensitivity of the self-employment rate to regulation appears greater in terms of statistical significance and magnitude than the sensitivity of unemployment. We then develop a model of rent creation and division featuring product and...

Post-Soviet African democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates, resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and ballot fraud. We propose a model of electoral competition where, although some voters oppose violence, it is effective in intimidating swing voters. We show that in equilibrium a weak challenger ...