Previous best shot experiments document behavior that converges towards the predicted equilibrium despite unequal equilibrium payoffs. Prasnikar and Roth [Quarterly Journal of Economics (1992) 865–888] hypothesize that strategic incentives displace fairness in this game. The current experiment illustrates that providing information differently results in fair outcomes.  2002 Elsevier Science B...

We study a model that integrates productive and socialization efforts with network choice and parental investments. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game. Individuals underinvest in productive and social effort. However, solving only the investment problem can exacerbate the misallocations due to network choice, to the point that in the presence of congestion effects the...

in the present paper, we introduce and study a fuzzy vector equilibrium problem and prove some existence results with and without convexity assumptions by using some particular forms of results of textit{kim} and textit{lee} [w.k. kim and k.h. lee, generalized fuzzy games and fuzzy equilibria, fuzzy sets and systems, 122 (2001), 293-301] and textit{tarafdar} [e. tarafdar, fixed point theorems i...

We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a network that meets the connection demands of a set of agents. The agents simultaneously choose paths in the network connecting their demand nodes. A mechanism splits the total cost of the network formed among the participants. We introduce two new properties of implementation. The first property, Pareto Nash Implementation (PNI), requires that th...

Many scholars have already focused on the use of equilibrium concepts in economics. Consequently, we must consider the extent to which new books on equilibrium improve our understanding of this subject. Equilibrium in economics does much to explain the historical development and scholarly value of equilibrium concepts in the natural and social sciences and contains much historical detail for a ...

In behavioral economics, human decision makers are modeled as anticipatory agents that make decisions by taking into account the probability of future (plans). We consider cyber-physical systems involving interaction between and statistical detection. A sensing device records an agent. Given these decisions, how can achieve quickest detection a change in system? From theoretic point view, model...

The general equilibrium analysis of perfectly competitive markets plays a central role in most attempts by positive economics to describe what happens in a market economy. It is usually admitted that there may be barriers to competition, that markets may be incomplete, and information may be lacking. Nevertheless, as a theoretical ideal which may approximate reality, general equilibrium analysi...

Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people’s strategic thinking even when a learning justification is implausible. Yet several recent experimental and empirical studies suggest that people’s initial responses to games often deviate systematically from equilibrium, and that s...

Over the last twenty-five years, a different approach to economics has been slowly birthing, and slowly growing—complexity economics. Complexity economics holds that the economy is not necessarily in equilibrium, that computation as well as mathematics is useful in economics, that increasing as well as diminishing returns may be present in an economic situation, and that the economy is not some...

We study several pre-communication protocols in a coordination game with incomplete information. Under decentralized decision making, we show that informative communication can be sustained in equilibrium, yet miscoordination arises with positive probabilities. Moreover, the equilibrium takes a partitional structure and messages are rank ordered, with higher messages becoming increasingly impre...