نتایج جستجو برای: evolutionary stable strategies
تعداد نتایج: 752257 فیلتر نتایج به سال:
The strategy of integration known as VMI (Vendor-Managed Inventory) allows the coordination of inventory policies between producers and buyers in supply chains. Based on a new proposed model for the implementation of VMI in a chain of two links composed of a producer and a buyer, this paper studies the evolution of individual strategies of the producer and the buyer by a formalism derived from ...
Innovation plays a central role in the development of modern economies, as does the regret of those who have missed the opportunity to try a successful new strategy. In contrast to purely biological environments, where new strategies emerge mainly by random mutation, human societies tend to exhibit more deliberate, although possibly imperfect inventions of new strategies. In this paper, we stud...
The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then exten...
During the last years the use of intelligent strategies for tuning Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controllers has been growing. The evolutionary strategies have won an important place thanks to their flexibility. In this paper, the automatic tuning of systems with stable and unstable dynamics, through a genetic approach is presented. The advantages of the proposed approach ere highlight...
The replicator equation used in evolutionary game theory (EGT) assumes that strategies reproduce in direct proportion to their payoffs; this is akin to the use of fitness-proportionate selection in an evolutionary algorithm (EA). In this paper, we investigate how various other selection methods commonly used in EAs can affect the discrete-time dynamics of EGT. In particular, we show that the ex...
When people learn that I study lethal injection, they are usually curious to know more (or at least they are polite enough to ask questions). Interestingly, the question that arises most often— from lawyers, law students, and laypeople—is why states behave as they do. In the wake of botched executions and ample evidence of lethal injection‘s dangers, why do states fail to address their executio...
A student, supported by his classmates, throws a piece of chalk at the teacher who is writing on the blackboard. The teacher rapidly turns back and promptly catches him in the act. The student blushes and suddenly realizes how bad it was what he did. What happened to the guy? Why did he decide to throw the piece of chalk? And why, after a few seconds, he would have liked that what he did had ne...
We examine a dynamical system consisting of two distinct, but interactive, subsystems, namely population dynamics and learning dynamics. The population dynamics formalize that the population shares of fitter groups increase relatively to those of less fit groups. The learning dynamics describe that each subgroup adapts its strategy, by placing more weight on activities contributing more than av...
This paper reviews a letter published in Nature by researchers B. Sinervo and C.M. Lively on “The rock-paper-scissors game and the evolution of alternative male strategies.” This paper explains what Sinervo and Lively studied, and how they modeled what they observed. Additionally, comments are given on how this model differs from a typical evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) model and a few sugg...
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