This paper considers whether, and how, the mind can be incorporated into structural realism. Section 1 begins with some definitions, and briefly reviews the main problems which beset structural realism. The existence of the mind is proffered as an additional problem, to which the rest of the paper is devoted. Three different philosophies of the mind are analysed, beginning with eliminative mate...

Abstract Research on the development of Theory Mind has often focused predominantly belief attribution, but recently moves have been made to include also other mental states. This includes especially factive states like knowledge, where may turn out be more basic than non-factive Mind. I argue that children’s early pretend play carries important implications for research. Although does not dire...

The Theory of Mind provides a framework for an agent to predict the actions of adversaries by building an abstract model of their strategies using recursive nested beliefs. In this paper, we extend a recently introduced technique for opponent modelling based on Theory of Mind reasoning. Our extended multi-agent Theory of Mind model explicitly considers multiple opponents simultaneously. We intr...

Clark and Chalmers (1998) introduced the extended mind hypothesis, according to which some mental states can be realized by non-biological external resources. A lively debate has flourished around this hypothesis, connected with the issues of embodiment, embeddedness, situatedness and enaction (cf. Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011). Two of the main criticisms addressed to the functional...

Many advocates of situated approaches to the study of cognition (e. Thelen and Smith, 1994) explicitly take exception to cognitive science's pronounced nativist turn. 1 Other proponents of situated models seek to mitigate strong nativist claims, by, for example, finding ways to acknowledge innate contributions to cognitive processing while at the same time downplaying those contributions (Wilso...

Radical enactive and embodied approaches to cognitive science oppose the received view in the sciences of the mind in denying that cognition fundamentally involves contentful mental representation. This paper argues that the fate of representationalism in cognitive science matters significantly to how best to understand the extent of cognition. It seeks to establish that any move away from repr...