Well-Functioning Daos and Moral Relativism Hagop Sarkissian (bio) What are the nature status of moral norms? And what makes individuals abide by them? These central questions in metaethics. The first concerns domain—for example, whether it exists independently or groups think it. second bindingness practical clout norms—how feel impelled to them.1 In this article, I bring two distinct approache...

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show two leading approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account Pritchard’s non-doxastic account) are vulnerable form incommensurability leads relativism. Building on both accounts, introduce new, minimally conception hinges avoids rationally resolves disagreements. According my proposed account, putative cas...

In The empirical stance, Bas van Fraassen argues for a reconceptualization of empiricism, and a rejection of its traditional rival, speculative metaphysics, as part of a larger and provocative study in epistemology. Central to his account is the notion of voluntarism in epistemology, and a concomitant understanding of the nature of rationality. In this paper I give a critical assessment of thes...

Our approach to global bioethics will depend, among other things, on how we answer the questions whether global bioethics is possible and whether it, if it is possible, is desirable. Our approach to global bioethics will also vary depending on whether we believe that the required bioethical deliberation should take as its principal point of departure that which we have in common or that which w...

1 Truth-relativism For our purposes, truth-relativism can be characterised as the doctrine that in a single world the very same token utterance can take different truth-values when considered in different contexts of assessment. The root semantic idea is already present in Lewis’s 1980, where an utterance of a sentence like “It is raining” is conceived as receiving a truth-value only when the v...