PRIVACY PRESERVING AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PROTOCOLS FOR COOPERATION IN DISTRIBUTED COMPUTATIONS

We demonstrate how the standard usage of the random incentive system in ambiguity experiments is not incentive compatible if the decision maker is ambiguity averse. We propose a slight modification of the procedure in which the randomization takes place before decisions are made and the state is realized and prove that if subjects evaluate the experimental environment in that way (first risk, s...

The choice of strategies by bidders who are allowed to communicate in auctions is studied. Using the tools of mechanism design, the possible outcomes of communication between bidders participating in a series of simultaneous first-price auctions are investigated. A variety of mechanisms are incentive compatible when side payments are not allowed. When attention is restricted to mechanisms that ...

We consider mechanism design problems in which agents perceive Knightian uncertainty. Uncertainty is formalized using incomplete preferences, as in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, individual decision making depends on a set of beliefs, and an action is preferred to another if and only if it has larger expected utility for all beliefs in this set. We consider two natural notions of incentiv...

We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. Further, we establish the uniqueness of the mechanism under an order additivity conditi...

In this paper, an incentive scheme based on crashing lead time is proposed to coordinate a supplier-retailer supply chain (SC). In the investigated SC, the supplier applies a lot-for-lot replenishment policy to replenish its stock and determines the replenishment multiplier. Moreover, the transportation lead time is considered under the control of the supplier. The retailer as downstream member...

We reconsider the theory of ambiguous property rights in China. In a static game context, this ownership allocation is good because a local entrepreneur can probably get services provided by local bureaucrats at lower costs than a private owner; but bad because once knowing the firm’s unobservable income, local bureaucrats are likely to encroach the firm. In an ongoing relationship, such a pred...