Given individual propensities to cheat (stealing, overcharging, etc.), the optimality conditions for the amount of resources devoted to law enforcement and for the severity o f penalties on convicted cheats are derived. In some interesting cases, the optimal penalty equals the market price divided by the probability of conviction and it is optimal to spend very little on enforcement and impose ...

This paper reviews the literature pertaining to the phenomenon of "suicide by cop"--any incident in which a suicidal individual attempts to get law enforcement to kill him. This article defines the term "suicide by cop," discusses the various motivations of individuals who engage in this type of behavior, presents the risk factors and indicators for suicide and violence, and describes specific ...

In 2003 the Government of Cambodia officially began to recognise that harm reduction was an essential approach to preventing HIV among people who use drugs and their sexual partners. Several programs aiming to control and prevent HIV among drug users have been implemented in Cambodia, mostly in the capital, Phnom Penh. However, there have been ongoing tensions between law enforcement and harm r...

Can the market provide law enforcement? This paper addresses this question by analyzing an historical case study: the system of private prosecutions that prevailed in England prior to the introduction of the police. I examine why this system came under strain during the Industrial Revolution, and how private clubs emerged to internalize the externalities that caused the private system to genera...