Recent literature suggests that electoral budget cycles are a phenomenon of new rather than established democracies. What part of the democratization process explains the amelioration of the political budget cycle? We argue the answer lies (in part) in the development of a strong party system. We extend the classic Rogoff-Siebert model to show that political budget cycles are possible in a legi...

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that proposal strategies are differentiable...

In this paper, we model a legislative calendar as an ordered list of issues to be considered in sequence. We present two equilibrium models of legislative scheduling, one presuming that the calendar is itself the object of collective choice and the other considering which calendars are immune from “discharge” (the change of at most one element of the calendar by a decisive coalition in the legi...

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Introduction Interstate water disputes are an increasingly common occurrence throughout the United States, as the demands on transboundary water resources continue to increase in magnitude and diversity. These disputes can involve a variety of water-related issues. In the arid and semi-arid West, the interstate allocation-or "apportionment"-is normally the central and often only concern. In the...