It is commonly assumed that all propositions have modal profiles and therefore bear their truth-values either contingently or necessarily. In what follows, I argue against this commonly assumed view and in defense of amodalism, according to which certain true propositions are neither necessarily nor contingently true, but only true simpliciter. My defense of amodalism proceeds indirectly. I beg...

In this paper, I argue that the modality contained in declarative sentences is heterogeneous by nature, and its indiscernible treatment evoked pardoxical behaviors of individuals in modal contexts. The difficulty is avoided by classifying the modality in two kinds from a normative point of view: 1) modality in a traditinal sense, which is a freedom under a certain convention, and 2) multi-modal...

Paraconsistent logic was born in the vicinity of modal logic. Moreover, as every other non-classical logicians, paraconsistentists have very often flirted with modalities. The first known system of paraconsistent logic was in fact defined as a fragment of S5, in the late 40s. But a fragment of a modal system is not necessarily a modal system. I will show here, indeed, that Jaśkowski’s D2 is not...