The two-dimensional Zakharov system is shown to have a unique global solution for data without finite energy if the L-norm of the Schrödinger part is small enough. The proof uses a refined I-method originally initiated by Colliander, Keel, Staffilani, Takaoka and Tao. A polynomial growth bound for the solution is also given.

—In this paper, we present a solution method for examination timetabling, consisting of two phases: a constraint programming phase to provide an initial solution and a simulated annealing phase with Kempe chain neighborhood. The second phase is equipped with some refined mechanisms that help to determine crucial cooling schedule parameters. We perform preliminary experiments of the algorithm on...

Abstract We propose a new method to specify linear models for vectors of time series with some convenient properties. First, it provides unified modeling approach single and multiple series, as the same decisions are required in both cases. Second, is scalable , meaning that quick preliminary model, which can be refined subsequent phases if required. Third, optionally automatic because specific...

A refined single-valued/interval neutrosophic set is very suitable for the expression and application of decision-making problems with both attributes and sub-attributes since it is described by its refined truth, indeterminacy, and falsity degrees. However, existing refined single-valued/interval neutrosophic similarity measures and their decision-making methods are scarcely studied in existin...

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters’ strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and t...

Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) has become a popular alternative to the standard Nash equilibrium concept in game theoretic applications. It is well known that human subjects do not regularly choose Nash equilibrium strategies. It has been hypothesized that subjects are limited by strategic uncertainty or that subjects have broader social preferences over the outcome of games. These two fact...