In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1 − α) and α fraction of the flow in a load balancing game. SOC tries to minimize the total cost faced by her players while MAL tries to maximize the same. If the latencies are linear, we show that this 2-player zero...

We introduce the notion of coordination mechanisms to improve the performance in systems with independent selfish agents. The quality of a coordination mechanism is measured by its price of anarchy—the worst-case performance of a Nash equilibrium over the (centrally controlled) social optimum. We give upper and lower bounds for the price of anarchy for selfish resource allocation and analyze th...

We consider the problem of efficient resource allocation in a grid computing environment. Grid computing is an emerging paradigm that allows the sharing of a large number of a heterogeneous set of resources. We propose an auction mechanism for decentralized resource allocation. The problem is modeled as a multistage stochastic programming problem. Convergence of the auction allocations to the s...

Factors affecting forage production, quality, marketing, and utilization include urbanization; availability of crop production resources; approaches to environmental stewardship; and other social and economic forces. Two factors of particular interest are 1) availability of pesticides for use in alfalfa and other forage crops; and 2) new laboratory procedures for predicting forage nutritional v...

We analyze an equilibrium search model in a duopoly setting with bilateral heterogeneities in production and search costs in which firms can advertise by announcing price and location. We study existence, stability, and comparative statics in such a setting, compare the duopolistic advertising level to the socially optimal level, and find conditions in which a duopolist advertises more or less ...

This paper considers firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources leads to underinvestment in the flexible resource and overinvestment in the local resource. Moreover, investment responds to demand correlation differently under monopoly and social optimum. This implies...

We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, an...

I characterise the dynamics of capacity accumulation and investment in advertising in a spatial monopoly model, contrasting the socially optimal behaviour of a benevolent planner against the behaviour of a pro...t-maximising monopolist. I show that, in steady state, the monopolist always distorts both kinds of investment as compared to the social optimum, except in a situation where the Ramsey ...

In a system where noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the price of anarchy, which is the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model where several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open...

Economy: worldwide accessibility for food/diminishing quantitative discrepancy between rich and poor countries providing a nutritional optimum per capita decreasing waste of food Food Security: tracing/tracking of animals and products developing a good agricultural practice building responsibility for the total supply chain Sustainability: meeting technical standards like CO 2 decrease/not livi...