In this paper a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model with capital accumulation is augmented by sticky wages. Wages are set in a staggered way as in Taylor (1980) implying that the optimal wage will be set for two periods. Prices are also sticky since there are adjustments cost of prices as in Rotemberg (1982). It is confirmed that wage staggering has a higher potential to generate...

A survey was conducted to assess the export supply and value chain analyses of okra (Abelmoschus esculentus L.) in Bangladesh. The survey was consisted of primary and secondary data from semistructured interview of key persons involved in the supply chains of export market of okra and from the review of relevant reports and literature. Primary data were collected from 40 middlemen (from Ulokhol...

Given the specific geographic and spatial location of rural areas in developing countries, to bring agrochemical to the rural farming households, it is argued, may have to come at a cost over and above the normal price it is sold in market. To this end, this work focuses on the willingness of rural farming households to pay more than the mean average regional retail price for agrochemicals in K...

This paper studies the role of stabilization policy in a model where …rm entry responds to shocks and uncertainty. We evaluate stabilization policy in the context of a simple analytically solvable sticky price model, where …rms have to prepay a …xed cost of entry. The presence of endogenous entry can alter the dynamic response to shocks, leading to greater persistence in the e¤ects of monetary ...

Strong procyclical fluctuations in the durable production are the most prominent feature of the empirical response to monetary shocks. This paper investigates the role of preferences in matching this feature of the data in a two-sector sticky price model with flexibly priced durables. The reaction of durables depends crucially on whether preferences are separable between labor and aggregate con...

Price-setting models with monopolistic competition and costs of changing prices exhibit coordination failure: in response to a monetary policy shock, individual agents lack incentives to change prices even when it would be Pareto-improving if all agents did so. The potential welfare gains are in part evaluated relative to a benchmark equilibrium of perfect, costless coordination; in practice, s...