Recall the online learning model we discussed in the previous lecture: N = # experts For t = 1, 2, . . . , T rounds: 1) each expert i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , makes a prediction ξi ∈ {0, 1} 2) learner makes a prediction ŷ ∈ {0, 1} 3) observe outcome y ∈ {0, 1} (a mistake happens if ŷ 6= y) With this framework in hand, we investigated a particular algorithm, Weighted Majority Algorithm (WMA), as follows: N ...

A population of identical individuals must choose one two alternatives under uncertainty about the state world. Individuals can acquire different levels costly information and complete contracts are not feasible. For such a setup, we investigate how vote delegation to committee suitable monetary transfers for its members ensure that high or optimal (jointly) acquired. We show (stable) uses majo...

We want to understand organizational process as the temporal making of meanings, but our vocabulary for doing so is predominantly spatial. Some mistakes this has led to in my own research are reviewed, and the hope for a more thoroughly temporal mode of analysis based on an actor’s ongoing narrativization of experience is explored.  2001 Published by Elsevier

This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a ”divide the dollar by majority rule” game with random proposers. A power index is called self-confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley value and other commonly used power indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses ...

We develop a general concept of majority rule for finitely many choice alternatives that is consistent with arbitrary binary preference relations, real-valued utility functions, probability distributions over binary preference relations, and random utility representations. The underlying framework is applicable to virtually any type of choice, rating, or ranking data, not just the linear orders...