Can randomized experiments at the individual level help assess the persuasive effects of campaign tactics? In the contemporary U.S., vote choice is not observable, so one promising research design involves randomizing appeals and then using a survey to measure vote intentions. Here, we analyze one such field experiment conducted during the 2008 presidential election in which 56,000 registered v...

Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the p...

Elections, and enfranchisement of citizens, are a foundational element of democracy, yet the implementation of elections in terms of both technology and process varies widely. [1] New voting technologies offer promise yet create new risks; and the process and technology must be simultaneously adopted and crafted. In order to explore both the promise and the risk, a Symposium at the Kennedy Scho...

For voters with ‘social’ preferences, the expected utility of voting is approximately independent of the size of the electorate, suggesting that rational voter turnouts can be substantial even in large elections. Less important elections are predicted to have lower turnout, but a feedback mechanism keeps turnout at a reasonable level under a wide range of conditions. The main contributions of t...

This paper considers a simple test for the correct specification of linear spatial autoregressive models, assuming that the choice of the weight matrix  is true. We derive the limiting distributions of the test under the null hypothesis of correct specification and a sequence of local alternatives. We show that the test is free of nuisance parameters asymptotically under the null and prove th...

Consider a committee of experts dealing with dichotomous choice problem, where the correctness probabilities are all greater than 1 2 . We prove that, if a random subcommittee of odd size m is selected randomly, and entrusted to make a decision by majority vote, its probability of deciding correctly increases with m. This includes a result of Ben-Yashar and Paroush (2000), who proved that a ran...

Should democracts value the freedom to choose? Do people value facing distinct choices when they make collective decisions? ‘Autonomy’ – the ability to participate in the making of collective decisions – is a paltry notion of freedom. True, democrats must be prepared that their preferences may not be realized as the outcome of the collective choice. Yet democracy is impoverished when many peopl...

We investigate the relationship between controversial roll call votes and support for Democratic incumbents in the 2010 midterm elections. Consistent with previous analyses, we find that supporters of health care reform paid a significant price at the polls. We go beyond these analyses by identifying a mechanism for this apparent effect: constituents perceived incumbents who supported health ca...

We investigate the relationship between controversial roll call votes and support for Democratic incumbents in the 2010 midterm elections. Consistent with previous analyses, we find that supporters of health care reform paid a significant price at the polls. We go beyond these analyses by identifying a mechanism for this apparent effect: constituents perceived incumbents who supported health ca...

We provide a theory of legislative bargaining in a setting where the institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium. We model negotiations over a set of discrete bills (i.e. bills that can only be approved or dismissed) as a repeated game where a status quo is amended until an agreement is reached. Our goal is to understand when logrolling or vote trading agreements occur....