This paper deals with basic and advanced principles and consequences of the informational in a philosophical, formalistic (symbolic), schematic, and graphical way. The central notion is informational entity as the operand and its interaction (operational property) with other entities and itself. Informational externalism, internalism, metaphysicalism, and phenomenalism are principles constituti...

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the d...

I would like to thank Benj Hellie, Chris Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel for their very interesting commentaries on The Character of Consciousness. All of them focus mainly on issues from the second half of the book, especially issues concerning the contents of consciousness. Hellie focuses especially on the role of acquaintance and perceptual attention in perception and introspection and on the o...

The present essay discusses the relationship between moral philosophy, psychology and education based on virtue ethics, contemporary neuroscience, and how neuroscientific methods can contribute to studies of moral virtue and character. First, the present essay considers whether the mechanism of moral motivation and developmental model of virtue and character are well supported by neuroscientifi...

According to intentionalism the phenomenal character (“what it’s like”) of a conscious experience is determined wholly by its representational content. In its strongest forms intentionalism offers the tantalizing prospect of a reduction of phenomenal character to representational content. Arguments based on Twin Earth-like scenarios have shown, however, that if phenomenal character supervenes o...

There are presently, or so it seems to me, three main views about the individuation of the content of intentional mental states. First, there is the no content view: the view that the content (of an intentional mental state) is an ordinary folk pre-scientific concept which can play no role in a respectable mature scientific psychology. Second there is a dualist (or bifurcationist) view of conte...