In the text-book model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future periods, and consumers who observe price under-cutting may correctly anticipate an ensuing price war and the...

We analyze how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing rule is “sign-preserving”. For Bertrand markets we define the class of “expectation sharing rules”, wh...

There exist various well-known characterizations of sets of numbers recognizable by a nite automaton, when they are represented in some integer base p 2. We show how to modify these characterizations, when integer bases p are replaced by linear numeration systems whose characteristic polynomial is the minimal polynomial of a Pisot number. We also prove some related interesting properties.

We develop a model of wage bargaining with private information in a duopoly. We investigate how product differentiation and market competition (Bertrand vs. Cournot competition) affect wages and strikes. If bargaining takes place at the industry-level, then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of product differentiation whatever the type of market competitio...

The years 2020 and 2021 mark a centenary since the great British polymath Bertrand Russell visited China. One hundred after visit of preeminent philosopher to...