The Bertrand-Darboux integrability condition for a certain class of perturbed harmonic oscillators is studied from the viewpoint of the BirkhoffGustavson(BG)-normalization: In solving an inverse problem of the BGnormalization on computer algebra, it is shown that if the perturbed harmonic oscillators with a homogeneous cubic-polynomial potential and with a homogeneous quartic-polynomial potenti...

Achieving software reliability takes many complementary techniques, directed at the process or at the products. This survey summarizes some of the most fruitful ideas. Cite as follows: Bertrand Meyer, Dependable Software, to appear in Dependable Systems: Software, Computing, Networks, eds. Jürg Kohlas, Bertrand Meyer, André Schiper, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 2006.

A player’s knowledge of her own actions and the corresponding own payoffs may enable her to infer or form belief about what the payoffs would have been if she had played differently. In studies of low-information game settings, however, players’ ex-post inferences and beliefs have been largely ignored by quantitative learning models. For games with large strategy spaces, the omission may seriou...

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for communication in low demand states. Therefore, partial communication in high demand states is sufficient t...

Product differentiation is well established as being the key source of the cereal industry’s high price-cost margins. However, there is little consensus as to whether pricing collusion is also a source of profitability, and indeed, whether price even serves as a strategic variable in this industry. This paper seeks to resolve this debate by determining whether cereal firms strategically interac...

We introduce a small cost of leading (small gain from waiting) in the two-player action commitment game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We investigate a quantity competition model with linear demand and constant marginal costs. We find that there exists a unique randomized strategy equilibrium as long as the leading cost is positive and not too large. The randomized strategy equilibr...