With the advent of e-commerce, logistics providers are faced with the challenge of handling fluctuating and sparsely distributed demand, which raises their operational costs significantly. As a result, horizontal cooperation are gaining momentum around the world. One of the major impediments, however, is the lack of stable and fair profit sharing mechanism. In this paper, we address this proble...

For the design of e,rperiments in multilevel papulations the following questions may arise: What is the optimal level of randomization ? Given a certain budget for sampling and measuring, what is the optimal allocation of units? What is the required budget for obtaining a certain power on the test of no treatment effect ? In this article these questions will be dealt with for populations with t...

We develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the all-pay auction mechanism whereby user bid for the channel, during each time-slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and the user that makes the higher bid wins use of the channel. Under the assumption that each user has a limited budget for bidding, we show the existence ...

In this report we construct two mechanisms that fully implement social welfare maximising allocation in Nash equilibria for the case of a single infinitely divisible good subject to multiple inequality constraints. The first mechanism achieves weak budget balance, while the second is an extension of the first, and achieves strong budget balance. One important application of this mechanism is un...

Statistical selection procedures are used to select the best simulated system from a finite set of alternatives. In this paper, we present a procedure that can be used to select the best system when the number of alternatives is large. The proposed procedure consists a combination between Ranking and Selection, and Ordinal Optimization procedures. In order to improve the performance of Ordinal ...

We develop an asset allocation approach that translates valuation signals into a suggested allocation. At its core, we simulate a mean-reverting value-price evolution to infer important distribution parameters as needed in our allocation rule. The latter relies on a broad range of parameters, thereby diversifying the model risk and making the framework stable. The simulation is calibrated to me...

Title of dissertation: MODELS FOR BUDGET CONSTRAINED AUCTIONS: AN APPLICATION TO SPONSORED SEARCH & OTHER AUCTIONS Abhishek Pani, Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 Dissertation directed by: Professor Subramanian Raghavan Robert H. Smith School of Business The last decade has seen the emergence of auction mechanisms for pricing and allocating goods on the Internet. A successful application area for auc...

The criterion of cost-effectiveness in health management may be given a welfare-theoretical justification if people are risk neutral with respect to life years. With risk aversion, the optimal allocation of health expenditures changes: Compared to the cost-effective allocation, more resources should be allocated to health conditions for which the expected outcomes even after treatment are worse...

Consider a competitive “spectrum economy” in communication system where multiple users share a common frequency band and each of them, equipped with an endowed “monetary” budget, will “purchase” its own transmit power spectra (taking others as given) in maximizing its Shannon utility or pay-off function that includes the effects of interference and subjects to its budget constraint. A market eq...

Abstract. In this report we construct two mechanisms that fully implement social welfare maximising allocation in Nash equilibria for the case of a single infinitely divisible good subject to multiple inequality constraints. The first mechanism achieves weak budget balance, while the second is an extension of the first, and achieves strong budget balance. One important application of this mecha...