We study monetary and fiscal policy games in a dynamic sticky price economy where monetary policy sets nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods financed with distortionary labor taxes. We compare the Ramsey outcome to non-cooperative policy regimes where one or both policymakers lack commitment power. Absence of fiscal commitment gives rise to a public spending bias, while...

There is widespread agreement that price stability (in practice, low and stable inflation) should be an objective of monetary policy. This agreement is reflected both in the mandates set for monetary policy by governments and in the practice of central banks. Several other important questions about the objectives for monetary policy are less settled: Should there be other objectives? If there a...

Oil price shocks are the main source of macroeconomic fluctuations in oil exporting countries. It is believed that appropriate monetary policy can help to stabilize these unwanted variations toward optimal allocations. A stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model featuring the properties of both cost push and wealth effect transmission channels is developed for the Iranian economy. In thi...

In this study, we examined the effects of monetary policy shocks on the performance of the Iranian macroeconomy and the banking system, under the different situations of the Basel II and III capital requirements regulations. By developing a DSGE Model and according to its structural shocks, four observable variables including output gap, bank capital adequacy, inflation, and money base growth r...

Many econometric studies use both a narrative approach and an interest rate series to investigate the e ects of US monetary policy. The two alternative measures provide very similar conclusions. This similarity in the results is not likely to be found when central banks use numerous instruments, including unconventional quantitative targets. This paper studies the French experience with tempora...

The paper describes a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. The key ingredient is that monetary policy is non-targeted. The ex-post bene ts from a monetary bailout accrue in proportion to the aggregate amount of leverage, while the distortion costs are to a large extent xed. This insight has important consequence...