Feasible elimination procedures (Peleg, 1978) play a central role in constructing social choice functions which have the following property: in the associated game form, for any preference profile there exists a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. In this paper we provide an axiomatic characterization of the social choice correspondence resulting from applying feasible eli...

In the recently proposed phenomenon, nuclear spin-induced circular dichroism (NSCD), collective magnetisation of nuclei induces circular dichroism in a light beam passing through a molecular sample. Here we present the first computational predictions of NSCD for fullerenes C60 and C70. We show that the NSCD signal is nucleus-specific, like in NMR spectroscopy. Thus, NSCD may provide a new and p...

This paper provides a non-symmetric generalization of the position value for communication situations. The definition of the weighted position value is motivated by the two different kinds of asymmetry in communication situations. It is shown that the weighted position value is characterized by component efficiency and a modification of balanced link contributions that is used by Slikker (Inter...

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte für Mathematik 110, 1990, 189–206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141–162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies und...

We consider “social contracts” which alter the payoffs of players in a noncoperative game, generating new Nash Equilibria (NE). In the domain of contracts which — in conjunction with their concomitant NE — are “self-financing”, our focus is on those that are (Pareto) optimal. By way of a key example, we examine optimal levels of crime and punishment in a population equilibrium. JEL Classificati...

Sufficient conditions for pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games to be Ž . Lyapunov stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, are discussed. In particular, it is shown that in almost all finite extensive-form games, all the pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In such games, all mixed-strategy equilibria close to pure-strategy equilibr...

This paper presents synthetically some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, some major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are brie‡y reviewed and discussed. A few economic applications are also illustrated to give a ‡avour of the type of predictions such models are ...

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring. Journal of Economic Liter...

It is commonly asserted that the standard wage equation derived from bargaining theory cannot be identified. Here, it is argued that the case for this alleged failure rests on an outmoded definition of identification. Newer concepts based on non-stationarities, cointegration and reduced rank are appropriate. An empirical example applying these concepts shows that the standard model can be deriv...

Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand why an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features in our motivations and to derive implications for the nature of our utility functions. Journal of Ec...