Europeanization is not only top-down and one-dimensional. National governments play two-level games, encountering non-state actors that seek to shape the national interest positions. Examining migration and asylum policy, a domain not yet subject to extensive scholarly attention, the role of non-state interest groups and their influence, where coalition-building is successful, is highlighted. E...

The September 2014 “People’s Climate March” was reportedly the largest climate change mobilization in history. The coalition of organizations behind the march chose a strategy of inclusion: They sought to create a “big tent” for a climate movement. Building on theoretical developments in the literature on digital media and social movements, we used Twitter as a window to observe how march organ...

Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the Australian federal government during the 2001–2004 election cycle. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary fundi...

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may challenge it, and it needs to be sel...

Collaborative logistics is becoming more important in today’s industry. This is driven by increased environmental concerns, improved efficiency through collaborative planning supporting resources sharing and new business models implementation. This paper explores collaborative logistics and reports on business applications within the forest products industry in Sweden and Canada. It first descr...

We present a novel framework for decentralised coalition formation in social networks, where agents can form coalitions through bilateral negotiations with their neighbours. Specifically, we present a practical negotiation protocol and decision functions that enable agents to form coalitions with agents beyond their peers. Building on this, we establish baseline negotiation strategies which we ...

We study the endogenous formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) in a symmetric three-country model with vertically related markets characterized by Cournot competition. We analyze the coalition-proof Nash equilibria in an FTA formation game in which each country forms an FTA with one, both, or none of its trading partners. We show that multilateral free trade is the unique stable equilibrium ...

In coalition formation with self-interested agents both social welfare of the multi-agent system and stability of individual coalitions must be taken into account. However, in large-scale systems with thousands of agents, finding an optimal solution with respect to both metrics is infeasible. In this paper we propose an approach for finding coalition structures with suboptimal social welfare an...

We consider abstract-argumentation-theoretic coalition formability in this work. Taking a model in political alliance among political parties, we will contemplate profitability, and then formability, of a coalition. As is commonly understood, a group forms a coalition with another group for a greater good, the goodness measured against some criteria. As is also commonly understood, however, a c...

The paper uses a non-cooperative simultaneous game for coalition structure formation (Levando, 2016) to demonstrate some applications of the introduced game: a cooperation, a Bayesian game within a coalition with intra-coalition externalities, a stochastic game, where states are coalition structures, self-enforcement properties of non-cooperative equilibrium and construction of a non-cooperativ...