Combinatorial auctions represent sophisticated market mechanisms that are becoming increasingly important in various business applications due to their ability to improve economic efficiency and auction revenue, especially in settings where participants tend to exhibit more complex user preferences and valuations. While recent studies on such auctions have found heterogeneity in bidder behavior...

We consider important design issues of the reverse auction, a key and innovative part of the FCC’s Incentive Auction. In the reverse auction, broadcasters compete to repurpose television broadcast spectrum for mobile broadband use. The Comment Public Notice (FCC 14-191) outlined the basic structure of the reverse auction. We take that basic structure as given and then examine critical elements ...

Much research has focused on the design of efficient combinatorial auctions. Recent gametheoreticalwork highlights that strategy-proof ascendingmechanisms for general valuations are impossible due to inherent free-rider problems in specific situations. We argue that these negative results are due to assumptions in Bayesian games which typically do not hold in online combinatorial auctions. Howe...

Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) are promising to increase social welfare by enabling bidders to express their valuation on any combination of items. A major issue of many CAs is the requirement to optimally solve the NP-hard Combinatorial Allocation Problem. To release a centralized auctioneer from that computational burden he can shift it to the bidders. One of the few discussed decentralized auc...

The European power grid can be divided into several market areas where the price of electricity is determined in a day-ahead auction. Market participants can provide continuous hourly bid curves and combinatorial bids with associated quantities given the prices. The goal of our auction is to maximize the economic surplus of all participants subject to quantity constraints and price constraints....

We present the design and analysis of an approximately incentive-compatible combinatorial auction. In just a single run, the auction is able to extract enough value information from bidders to compute approximate truth-inducing payments. This stands in contrast to current auction designs that need to repeat the allocation computation as many times as there are bidders to achieve incentive compa...

Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs) are IT-based economic mechanisms where bidders submit bundle bids in a sequence and an auctioneer computes allocations and ask prices in each auction round. The literature in this field provides equilibrium analysis for ICAs with non-linear personalized prices under strong assumptions on bidders’ strategies. Linear pricing has performed very well in the l...

This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Combinatorial auctions, in which multiple goods are sold simultaneously, have recently attracted considerable attention. The GVA can handle combinatorial auctions and has good theoretical characteristics such as incentiv...

The popularity of auctions has increased dramatically with their introduction on the Internet. This migration has provided a unique opportunity to harness the power of computing to create new auction forms that were previously impossible. We describe a new type of combinatorial auction that accepts incompletely specified bids that provide a framework to guide, rather than dictate, the choice of...

In this paper we study the Nash-equilibrium and equilibrium bidding strategies of the Pooled Reverse Auction for troubled assets. The auction was described in (Ausubel & Cramton 2008[1]). We further extend our analysis to a more general class of games which we call Summation Games. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nashequilibrium in these games when the utility functions satisfy a cer...